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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT PALMER, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20080558-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
•k -k i: -k 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has a appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that prior DUI convictions are 
not elements of a third degree felony DUI offense? 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in it conclusion that the Utah Legislature 
intended Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (6)(a) to constitute a sentence enhancement to 
increase punishment for a recidivist rather than a separate DUI offense element? 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Palmer's denial of the right to a 
trial by jury is harmless error? 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^  9, 179 P.3d 775 
1 
(citation omitted). "We review questions of law for correctness, granting no deference to 
the legal conclusions of the court of appeals/5 State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39. ]^ 11, 140 
P.3d 1219. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jur\ shall remain in\ iolatc. In capital cases the 
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. V 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. **** 
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal stems from the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Palmer, 2008 UT 
App 206, 189 P.3d 69,wherein the majority of the Court of Appeals held that Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) defines a sentence enhancement rather than separate elements of the 
offense. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Robert Palmer was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on or about January 4, 2005, with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
with priors, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2004) (R. 
1). 
A jury trial was held on August 8, 2006 (R. 75-77; 104). Palmer was not present 
and was tried in absentia (R. 104: 11). Palmer was found guilty of driving under the 
influence of alcohol (R. 72; 104: 112). By stipulation of the parties, the trial court 
excused the jury and the prosecution presented evidence of Palmer's two prior 
convictions (R. 104: 115-121; 105: 6-7). The trial court determined that the two prior 
convictions were within the last 10 years, and found Palmer guilty of a third degree 
felony (R. 84). 
New counsel for Palmer asserted that Palmer was denied his constitutional right to 
trial by jury, where the trial court, instead of the jury, considered the two prior 
convictions and the trial court found Palmer guilty of driving under the influence, a third 
degree felony (R. 105: 3-8). After hearing oral arguments, the trial court found Palmer's 
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rights to a jury trial were violated but denied his motion on the basis that the error in 
waiving the jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 105: 9-10). 
Palmer was sentenced on September 18, 2006 to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State prison (R. 98; 105:16). Palmer timely appealed (R. 
101). On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds. See 
State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^ 22-23. Instead of ruling on the issue of Palmer's 
denial of the right to have a jury trial hear all of the evidence against him, the Court of 
Appeals held that the Legislature intended Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (6)(a) to be merely 
sentencing enhancement language and not elements of the third degree felony offense. 
Id. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
On September 23, 2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office pulled Palmer over for making an illegal turn and driving a vehicle with 
an expired registration (R. 104:19). There was "a very strong [odor] of an alcoholic 
beverage" when Sergeant Alexanderson approached Palmer (R. 104: 19-20). 
Additionally, Palmer had ccan extremely difficult time" producing his driver's license, and 
"his speech was slurred" in a "thick tongue sort o f way (R. 104: 21-23). Sergeant 
Alexanderson, assisted by backup officers, suspected Palmer was intoxicated and 
administered three field sobriety tests; Palmer failed all three (R; 104: 56-63). 
Accordingly, Palmer was arrested for DUI (R. 104: 66). A subsequent breathalyzer test 
!
 The facts are taken directly from the court of appeals decision in State v Palmer, 2008 
UT App 206, If 3. 
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measured Palmer's blood alcohol concentration at .318, nearly four times the legal limit 
of.08(R. 104:66). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the Utah Legislature intended 
that "recidivist" statutes, including Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a), are merely 
sentencing enhancements that are not subject to the right to a trial by jury, enshrined in 
both the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously bootstrapped Federal case law to Utah law in 
divining the Legislature's intent as it relates to § 41-6-44(6)(a) and other similar statutes 
which increase the penalty and level of offense. 
The Court of Appeals also erroneously concluded that State v Harris, 264 P. 284 
(Utah 1953), is no longer controlling, even though this Court specifically held that under 
§ 41-6-44, prior convictions are elements of the offense that must be submitted to the 
jury. 
In additions, the Court of Appeals likely did not consider the consequences of its 
conclusion that the Utah Legislature intended that "recidivist" statutes are not subject to 
the jury trial guarantee. 
Finally, Palmer asserts that the trial court's error in not submitting the evidence of 
prior convictions to the jury is the type of fundamental error that is not subject to the 
harmless error analysis and that prejudice should be presumed. For these reasons, Palmer 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED FEDERAL CASE LAW 
INTERPRETING FEDERAL STATUTES WHEN CONCLUDING 
THAT PRIOR DUI CONVICTIONS ARE MERELY SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENTS AND NOT ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
The Court of Appeals found that Palmer did not have a constitutional right to have 
evidence of his prior convictions decided by a jury based on its conclusion that Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) is merely a sentencing enhancement provision and not 
elements of the third degree felony DUI offense. See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206. <|j 22. 
This conclusion was based on the erroneous finding that the Utah Legislature intended 
DUI prior convictions to act as enhancement factors and not elements, and as such, the 
Sixth Amendment does not require recidivism to be submitted to the jury. See Id. at ^ 9, 
23. However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Utah 
legislative intent and bootstrapped federal case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment as 
applied to Congressional intent of recidivism statutes, wherein Congress does not require 
recidivism to be submitted to the jury when it is merely used as a sentencing 
enhancement. A proper look at the plain language of § 41-6-44 as well as its history and 
interpretations from this Court shows that prior DUI convictions are elements of the 
underlying DUI third degree felony offense. 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, «| 9, 179 P.3d 775 
(citation omitted). "We review questions of law for correctness, granting no deference to 
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the legal conclusions of the court of appeals " State v Valdez, 2006 UT 39, % 11, 140 
P3d 1219 
A. Federal case law interpreting Congressional intent does not 
control Utah legislative intent. 
The Court of Appeals lound that undei Appi endi v New Jeisey, 530 U S 466 
(2000) the Supreme Court has expressl) ruled that the Sixth Amendment does not 
require prior convictions to be submitted to the jury when used merely as a sentence 
enhancement," and that "recidivist enhancements stand on unique legal footing that 
allows the trial judge to determine if the defendant is a repeat offender " Palme?, 2008 
UI App 206, ^ 9, 19, n 12 The Court of Appeals also found that under Almendai ez-
Tones\ United States, 523 U S 224(1998) [R]eudi\ism does not lelate to the 
commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment onh, therefoie [need not] be 
deemed an element'of petitioner's offense ' Palmei 2008 UT App 206 f^ 15 
(ongmal emphasis) (quoting Almendai ez-Toi i es 523 U S at 244) Accoidmg to the 
Court of Appeals, if § 41-6-44(6)(a) is meiely a sentence enhancement, then the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply Id at f 9 In addition, the Court of Appeals found that 
because the United States Supreme Couit has determined that Congress treats most 
recidivist statutes as enhancement penalties and not elements of the charged offense, then 
the Utah Legislature had the same intent to make § 41-6-44(6)(a) an enhancement penalty 
and not elements of the underlying DUI third degree felony offense See Palmer, 2008 
UT App 206, f^t 15, 18, 19 This faulty logic, however, does not withstand simple 
scrutiny 
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While it is true that some federal cases have limited the application of the Sixth 
Amendment's jury guarantee in some instances relating to federal statutes, these cases do 
not compel the conclusion the Court of Appeals reached that the Sixth Amendment never 
applies to recidivist statutes. See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, j^ 9. In addition, these 
federal cases provide little if any insight into the Utah Legislature's intent regarding § 4 1 -
6-44 and the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee to the States. 
Almendarez-Torres does not limit all recidivist type laws from the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee, and it expresses no opinion on the jury trial right 
regarding state statutes. In Almendarez-Torres\ the only issue before the United States 
Supreme Court was whether Congress intended 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) to proscribe a 
separate offense or simply a sentencing enhancement. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 
226. After reviewing Congress' intent behind the law, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress intended the provision to be a penalty enhancement and that it was not an 
element subject to the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial. Id. at 235. 
Apprendi also does not impede on the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee 
regarding federal or state statutes. In Apprendi the defendant fired several bullets into an 
African-American family's home, and he entered a plea to possession of a firearm for an 
unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of an anti-personal bomb. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 469. The sentencing judge, however, enhanced the defendant's sentence by ten years 
after finding that the defendant had violated the "hate crime" law, by acting "with a 
purpose to intimidate ... on the basis of race, color, [etc.] .. ." Id. at 468-69. The issue 
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before the Supreme Court was whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial to 
consider the additional evidence of the motive behind the crime. Id. at 469. 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant's rights were violated when the 
sentencing judge, not a jury, found that the defendant had violated the hate crime law. 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 490. The Court rejected the assertion that motive was merely 
a sentencing factor and not an element of the underlying offense. Id. at 471. 
The question of whether federal recidivist statutes are subject to the jury trial 
guarantee was not at issue before the Court. The Apprendi Court was concerned with the 
legislature attempting to skirt around Sixth Amendment jury trial protections by labeling 
elements of the offense as sentencing enhancements. Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 475-76. 
While the Apprendi Court included the language from Jones v United States, 526 U.S. 
227, 243 n.6 (1999), which states Cwany fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases 
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt," this language cannot reasonably be interpreted to 
mean that recidivist factors defined as elements of the underlying offense are not subject 
to the Sixth Amendment's jury protections. 
In fact, the Apprendi Court went to great lengths to explain that legislatures may 
not "remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of 
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed," other than facts "of a prior 
conviction." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Accordingly, the Supreme Court was not 
holding that recidivist statutes are never subject to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial 
guarantee; rather, the Supreme Court held that legislatures, if they choose, do not have to 
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subject recidivist statutes to the jury trial process. See Id. Moreover, Apprendi cannot be 
read to mean that the Supreme Court intended that trial judges, and not the legislature, 
determines whether a recidivist statute is merely an enhancement provision not subject to 
the jury trial right, as suggested by the Court of Appeals. See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, 
1f 19, n. 12. 
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that "'the question of which factors are' 
elements and which factors are sentence enhancements cis normally a matter for [the 
legislative branch]."5 Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, \ 10 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 
U.S. at 228). It is up to the legislature to define the elements of a crime. However, 
legislatures may not define a crime in a manner to avoid the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
guarantee, as was done in Apprendi. But nothing prevents legislatures from defining 
recidivist factors as elements of the underlying offense and thus subject to Sixth 
Amendment protections. Accordingly, Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi cannot be 
properly interpreted to subvert Sixth Amendment jury trial rights without first divining 
legislative intent. Moreover, Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi do not preclude the Utah 
Legislature from making recidivism elements of an offense that are subject to the jury 
right. 
As long as the Utah Legislature has made § 41-6-44 (6)(a) elements of the third 
degree felony offense, neither Apprendi nor Almendarez-Torres subvert the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. It is only when the Utah Legislature intends that prior 
convictions not be elements of the underlying offense that the jury trial right does not 
attach. 
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B. The Utah Legislature intended § 41-6-44(6)(a) to be elements of 
the DUI third degree felony offense. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously found that the Utah Legislature did not intend 
§ 41-6-44(6)(a) to be elements of the DUI third degree felony offense. To support this 
conclusion, the Court of Appeals looked at the plain language and structure of the statute, 
attempted to distinguish State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (Utah 1953), and attempted to 
draw further support from Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi. However, a review of the 
plain language, structure, and history of the statute shows that the Legislature intended 
§ 41-6-44(6)(a) to be elements of the DUI third degree felony offense. 
"The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the true intent of 
the Legislature;* Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, \ 13, 193 P.3d 86 (citation 
omitted). The Court first looks to the statute's plain language and seeks "to render all 
parts thereof relevant and meaningful," and will "avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of the statute superfluous or in operative." Hall v. Dept. ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 
15, 24 P.3d 958 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) provides: 
A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two 
or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after 
July 1,2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 
2001. 
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U.C.A. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2004).2 While a class B misdemeanor DUI conviction can be 
obtained upon a person being in physical control of a vehicle and being sufficiently under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, the plain language of § 41-6-44(6)(a) shows that a third 
degree felony conviction for DUI cannot be obtained without proof of the elements found 
in § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) or (ii). Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding otherwise, nothing 
in the plain language of the statute suggests that the Utah Legislature intended subsection 
(6)(a) to be enhancement penalties only. Moreover, there is nothing in the plain language 
of the statute that suggests that subsection (6)(a) is not subject to the jury trial right. As 
the dissent in Palmer ably demonstrates, the plain language of subsection (6)(a) provides 
an additional element to the elements contained in subsection (2). Palmer, 2008 UT App 
206, |^ 33. 
However, the majority in Palmer believes that subsection (2) contains all the 
elements of the offense and the remaining subsections provide only sentencing 
enhancements that increase the maximum penalty. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^[ 16, 19, 
n. 12. The structure of the statute shows that the Utah Legislature intended otherwise. 
Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) contain additional elements that increases the penalty and 
punishment of the offense. Subsection (3)(a) increases the offense to a class A 
misdemeanor if the person inflicts "bodily injury on another," 'had a passenger under 16 
years of age," or "was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age 
in the vehicle..." U.C.A. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(A), (B), and (C). And subsection (3)(b) 
contains the additional elements that the penalty is increased to a third degree felony if 
~ See Addendum C. 
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the driver "inflicts substantial bodily injury" to another. Thus, additional elements are 
found in subsections other than subsection (2). 
In addition, the Court of Appeals' holding that the only elements of the offense are 
found in subsection (2) is contrary to State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, 76 P.3d 198, 
wherein the Court of Appeals found that the State was required to prove the additional 
element that the defendant "had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense." Id. at ^ 12; see also Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^ 35. 
Accordingly, nothing in the plain language or structure of subsection (6)(a) 
suggests that the Legislature intended these elements to be enhancement penalties only 
and not subject to the right to a trial by jury. 
The Court of Appeals further concluded that by amending § 41-6-44 over forty 
times since Harris was decided is further evidence that the Legislature intended 
subsection (6)(a) to be merely sentencing enhancements not subject to the jury trial 
guarantee. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, f^ 18. The Court of Appeals' conclusion is wrong 
and erroneously overruled Harris. 
The Court of Appeals attempts to distinguish Harris, asserting that it is no longer 
controlling since it was decided under the Utah Constitution and because federal law does 
not afford the right to trial by jury for recidivist laws. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^ 18. 
The Court of Appeals further asserts that the Legislature has amended the DUI statute 
numerous times since 1953, making Harris no longer relevant. Id. However, as the 
dissent capably points out, Harris "has not been altered, distinguished, or reversed" by 
this Court and "Harris is binding law that is directly on point." Id. at ]f 28. 
13 
In Harris, the defendant was convicted for driving a vehicle while under the 
influence ("DUI") with a prior DUI conviction, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(1953). Harris, 264 P.2d at 285. At trial, the defendant was tried by a jury on the DUI 
charge without any reference to the prior conviction. Id. Upon a verdict of guilty, 
evidence of a prior conviction was submitted to the jury. Id. The defendant asserted that 
he was not the same individual as the individual convicted of the prior DUL a certified 
copy of which was submitted to the jury. Id. Upon a question by a juror, the trial court 
told the jury that it could only consider whether the certified copy of the prior DUI 
conviction was an authentic document. Id. With this instruction, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of a prior conviction. Id. 
This Court found that the trial court's instruction improperly withdrew from the 
jury's consideration the real issue, whether the jury "believed from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant5' was the same person named on the certified record. 
Harris, 264 P.2d at 285. This Court held that cc[t]he prior conviction was a material 
element of the indictable misdemeanor with respect to which the defendant was charged, 
tried, and sentenced...." Id. at 286. A new trial was necessary on the entire case ccin view 
of the fact that the two alleged offenses, the instant and the former one, constitute one 
composite crime for which one sentence must be imposed." Id. at 286. 
Accordingly, this Court held that prior convictions are elements of the offense. 
Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. Since Harris was decided in 1953, it has not been distinguished 
or reversed. The Court of Appeals, however, dismisses Harris on the basis that § 41-6-44 
has been amended over forty times between 1953 and 2004. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, 
14 
TI 18. Notably, not once, in all of the forty plus amendments to the statute between 1953 
and 2004 has the Legislature significantly changed the format of the statute or made an 
attempt to add language indicating that prior convictions are merely sentencing 
enhancements and no longer elements of the third degree felony offense. See Palmer, 
2008 UT App 206, ^ 30. The fact that the language and structure of the 2004 statute is 
substantially the same as the 1953 statute provides overwhelming evidence that the 
Legislature intended for subsection (6)(a) to be elements of the third degree offense. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953)3; see id. § 41-6-44 (2004). If the Legislature had 
intended subsection (6)(a) to no longer be elements of the offense and merely sentencing 
enhancement factors not subject to the Sixth Amendment, the structure and language 
would have been changed to account for Harris. See Olsen v Larson, 2007 UT29, \ 39, 
158 P.3d 532 (ccWe presume the Legislature is aware of our case law...."). Because no 
such changes have been made, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Harris no 
longer controls because the statute has been amended forty plus times. 
The Court of Appeals is also wrong in finding that Harris is inapplicable because 
it was decided wCunder the Utah Constitution and not under the United States 
Constitution." Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, J^ 18. This distinction has no relevance. The 
defendant's conviction in Harris was reversed because his right to have a jury consider 
all of the elements he was charged with was violated. Harris, 264 P.2d at 285-86. At 
that time, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury was not extended to the States. 
Instead, this right was located in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. In fact, it 
J
 See Addendum D. 
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was not until Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), that the Sixth Amendment's 
jury trial guarantee was extended to the States. See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, j^ 7, n.5. 
Had Harris been decided after Duncan, either constitutional provision guaranteeing the 
right to trial by jury would provide the same relief. That this is true is inherent in the 
Court of Appeals' acknowledgment that the "Sixth Amendment's provisions have been 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as providing a criminal defendant with 
'the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element 
of the crime with which he is charged."5 Id. at ^ 8 (original emphasis) (quoting United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995)). Thus, the Court of Appeals' attempt to 
distinguish Harris for being decided under the Utah Constitution fails. 
In any event, Harris provides that prior convictions under § 41-6-44 are elements 
of the offense and that all of these elements constitute one crime that is subject to the jury 
trial right located in Article I, Sections 10 and 12. Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. Accordingh, 
Palmer was denied his right to have the jury consider all the elements charged against 
him in violation of both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals also erroneously concluded that Apprendi and Almendarez-
Torres somehow overrule Harris because "the United States Supreme Court articulated 
the difference between elements and enhancements, carving out an exception to the Sixth 
Amendment for recidivism enhancements." Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, f^ 18. As 
explained above in point 1(A), the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi 
and Almendarez-Torres have no bearing on the Utah Legislature's intent as to whether 
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subsection (6)(a) was intended to be elements of the offense or merely surplus sentencing 
enhancement language. These decisions also do not overrule Harris. 
C. The Court of Appeals' Decision provides unintended 
consequences that the Utah Legislature never intended. 
Palmer asserts that several unintended and troubling consequences arise from the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that recidivist statutes are not subject to the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. 
If the Court of Appeals' erroneous decision is not reversed, there are numerous 
"recidivist" statutes that provide additional penalties for prior convictions that will now 
be subject to courts deciding that the Legislature intended these to be sentencing factors 
only and not elements of the offense and no longer subject to the Sixth Amendment's 
jury trial guarantee. 
A few of these statutes are listed here. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b) provides 
that if a person is convicted of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, then 
upon a second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is raised one degree. Section 58-37-
8(2)(c) further provides that if a person illegally possesses a controlled substance 
subsequent to a conviction for manufacturing or distributing drugs, then the penalty is 
raised one degree. Section 58-37-8 also provides additional penalties for subsequent 
convictions under this chapter. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4(2)(b), and (3), assault against a peace 
officer, provide increased penalties for second and subsequent assault convictions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(7), stalking, provides an increased penalty for a prior stalking 
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conviction. And Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(ii), theft, provides increased penalties 
for two prior convictions. 
Each of these statutes is similar to § 41-6-44 in that they each contain an 
underlying offense that is subject to greater penalties and a greater level of offense if a 
similar or prior offense is committed (the Court of Appeals refers to these statutes as 
"recidivisf statutes). See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ffij 18. 19. Moreover, each of these 
statutes is subject to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these are merely enhancement 
factors not subject to the jury trial right. Additionally, these statutes are now subject to 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that ''recidivist enhancements ... allows the trial judge 
to determine if the defendant is a repeat offender." Id. at f^ 19, n. 12. 
An unintended consequence is apparent. For example, suppose a defendant is 
charged with theft, with two prior convictions, resulting in a third degree felony charge. 
Through plea negotiations, the defendant enters a plea to a reduced misdemeanor charge. 
At sentencing, the trial court considers the fact that the defendant has two prior 
convictions for theft. The sentencing judge increases the level of offense to a third 
degree felony and the defendant is sent to prison. 
This same example can be used with every single statute that has increased 
penalties for prior or subsequent convictions. It can also be used for § 41-6-44. A 
defendant, through plea negotiations, can enter a plea to a reduced charge of DUI, a class 
B misdemeanor, even though there are two prior convictions within ten years. At 
sentencing, the trial court is free to increase the penalty to a third degree felony based on 
the Court of Appeals' erroneous conclusion. 
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In addition, the situation often arises where the charging document does not 
include information regarding prior convictions. A plea deal is negotiated and the 
defendant is sentenced. Upon a completed report from Adult Parole & Probation 
reviewing the defendant's criminal record, the sentencing judge learns about prior 
convictions and the ultimate penalty and level of offense is increased. 
There is no evidence that the Utah Legislature intended this draconian but certain 
consequence. 
Moreover, with sentencing courts free to increase the level of offense at 
sentencing for such "recidivist" statutes, district courts will become clogged with cases 
because of defense attorneys' unwillingness to negotiate reduced charges when the 
sentencing court has full discretion to increase the penalty to the original charge. 
The Utah Legislature certainly never intended such a result under § 41-6-44 or any 
of the other "recidivist" statutes. It is also doubtful that the Court of Appeals considered 
this outcome either. 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals erroneously divined legislative intent in 
concluding that the Utah Legislature purposely intended so called "recidivist" statutes to 
be merely enhancements not subject to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO 
THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD 
The trial court found that although Palmer was denied his right to have a jury 
consider the prior DUI convictions, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
(R. 105: 9-11). Palmer asserted before the Court of Appeals that such error was 
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structural error not subject to the harmless error analysis. See Aplt Br. at 8-12. Palmer 
also asserted before the trial court that such error violated his right to have a jury consider 
evidence of the two prior convictions (R. 105: 3). However, due to the Court of Appeals' 
finding that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (6)(a) is merely sentencing enhancement language 
and not elements of third degree felony DUI, the Court of Appeals did not address the 
issue. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, If 22, n. 16. 
Palmer asserts that the trial court's refusal to return the question of whether he had 
two valid prior convictions for DUI back to the jury violated both the Sixth Amendment 
and his rights under the Utah Constitution to a trial by jury. Palmer further asserts that 
such error was structural error and not subject to the harmless error analysis. 
Admittedly. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), holds that "[fjailure to 
submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not 
structural error." Id. at 222. While Recuenco precludes Palmer's argument under the 
Sixth Amendment, it does not preclude his argument under Utah law. See Id. at 218, n. 1 
("Respondent's argument that, as a matter of state law, the Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004), error was not harmless remains open to him on remand.") (original 
emphasis). 
Article I, Sections 10 and 12 provide the right to a trial by jury. Specifically, 
Section 10 provides, "In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous." And Section 12 
provides that "the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury...." The Sixth Amendment provides similar protections: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
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impartial jury...." However, the Utah Constitution provides greater protections regarding 
the jury trial right than the Sixth Amendment. See e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 
130, 136-37 (1979) (the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimous jury verdicts); see 
also Wood v. University of Utah Med. OK, 2002 UT 134, ^ 29, 67 P.3d 436 (the Utah 
constitution may provide greater protections than the federal constitution). Palmer asserts 
that these greater protections apply to the issue before this Court, whether it was 
reversible error to issue a directed verdict for the State on evidence of two prior 
convictions. 
Before the trial court, Palmer alerted the trial judge of the error in not submitting 
the evidence of prior convictions to the jury and requested that a jury consider the 
evidence (R. 105: 3). Harmless error cannot apply if the right to a jury trial remains 
inviolate as guaranteed under the Utah Constitution. By considering the evidence of the 
two prior convictions, the trial court erroneously usurped the jury's fact finding duty in 
violation of Article I, Sections 10 and 12. This error cannot be considered harmless 
because it resulted in the trial court issuing a directed verdict for the State. Palmer was 
denied his right to have the jury consider all the elements of the offense with which he 
was charged. Thus, Palmer never enjoyed the full right to a jury trial that is enshrined in 
our Utah Constitution. Regardless of what the ultimate outcome may have been, that is 
no excuse to ignore the Utah Constitution. 
This Court has long held that the right to a jury trial is inviolate. In State v. 
Jordan, 196 P. 565 (Utah 1921), the defendant was convicted of having carnal knowledge 
of a person under the age of 18 years. Id. at 566. Although the case was tried before a 
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jury, before the trial proceedings commenced, the trial court ordered most of the public 
out of the courtroom pursuant to a state statute. Id. The defendant objected, but the trial 
court overruled the objection. Id. at 614. 
On appeal the State asserted that the defendant was unable to show any prejudice 
by being denied a public trial. Jordan, 196 P. at 617-18. This Court, however, looked to 
Article I, Section 12, and found that "the constitutional right to a public trial is ... sacred 
and may not be infringed upon ...." Id. at 617. Accordingly, this Court held that the 
defendant was "denied a public trial within the meaning of our Constitution" and found 
that it was unnecessary for the defendant to show any prejudice. Id. at 618. 
Although Jordan dealt with the infringement of the right to a public jury trial, 
Palmer asserts that its analysis is applicable here. Palmer was denied his right to have the 
jury hear all the evidence with which he was charged. Such an infringement is just as 
troubling if not more troubling than being denied the right of a public jury trial. The right 
to have a jury of one's peers consider all the evidence against him is fundamental to our 
system of government, just at the right to a public jury trial is. See Jordan, 196 P. at 567-
68. Under such circumstances, the denial of this fundamental right should be presumed 
prejudicial. 
Just like in Jordan, this is not an issue about what the ultimate outcome would be. 
The issue is whether or not the Utah Constitution really means what it says, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury ...." Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12. If trial courts are allowed to infringe on 
this precious right, and later such fundamental and important constitutional violations are 
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considered merely harmless, then the inherent and inalienable rights enshrined in our 
Utah Constitution are not actually inherent and inalienable. Rather, such rights are 
merely words subject to judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons set forth in the Dissenting 
Opinion, Palmer requests that the Court of Appeals' decision be reversed, that his third 
degree felony conviction be reversed, that the sentence be vacated, and that the case be 
remanded to the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s * ^ day of October, 2008. 
Aaron P. Dodd ^ 
Counsel for Defendant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, to the following, Attorney General, Appeals Division, 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, t h i s ^ ^ 
day of October, 2008. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Defendant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
lili 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Palmer, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Case No. 200805S8-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on June 30, 2008. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Dated /-
FOR THE COURT: 
0 
SM^thew B." Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on September 16, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
maiJ or placed an the Interdepartmental marl service, or hand 
delivered to the parties listed below: 
RYAN D TENNEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
AARON P DOPE 
} 1 PPPJOPP PPPNCER LLC 
3 301 N UNLVERSITY AVE 
PROVO UT 8 4 604 
LTSA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Dated this September 16, 2008. 
CJJ-JL. 
Deputy Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20080558 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT Case No. 051400027 
ADDENDUM B 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Palmer, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060925-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ) 
2 00 8 UT App 2 06 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 051400027 
The Honorable Samuel D. McVey 
Attorneys: Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Thorne, McHugh, and Orme 
McHUGH, Judge: 
%1 Robert 
(2) (a) of Ut 
operate a ve 
drug (DUI). 
Subsection ( 
third degree 
convictions 
Palmer argue 
rather than 
Palmer challenges his conviction under subsection 
ah Code section 41-6-44, which makes it unlawful to 
hide while under the influence of alcohol or any 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (Supp. 2004) ,x 
6)(a) of the same section declares that DUI is a 
felony if the defendant has two or more prior 
within the past ten years. See id. § 41-6-44(6)(a), 
s that subsection (6)(a) defines a separate crime, 
a sentence enhancement, and that the trial court 
1. Utah Code section 41-6-44 was amended and renumbered in 2005. 
See Traffic Code Recodification and Revisions, ch. 2, §§ 58-59, 
Utah Laws 18, 56-60 (current version as amended at Utah Code 
Supp. 2007))/ Alcohol Restricted 
2005 Utah Laws 627, 627-28 (current 
§§ 41-6a-502, -503 (Supp. 2007)). 
occurred prior to these revisions, we 
otherwise noted. See State v. 
1 n.l, 127 P.3d 1252. 
2005 
Ann. § § 
Drivers 
version 
Because 
cite to 
46-6a-502, -503 
ch. 91, §§ 1-2, 
at Utah Code Ann 
Palmer's actions 
the 2004 code 
Gonzales, 2 0 05 UT App 
unless 
538, 1 
committed structural error when it found Palmer had two prior 
convictions without submitting that question to the jury. 
H2 We conclude that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement 
provision, which merely increases the sentence for a recidivist. 
Subsection (6)(a) does not define a separate crime and therefore 
does not require a jury trial to establish prior convictions. 
Accordingly, we affirm Palmer's felony DUI conviction. 
BACKGROUND2 
H3 On September 23, 2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the 
Utah County Sheriff's Office pulled Palmer over for making an 
illegal turn and driving a vehicle with an expired registration. 
There was "a very strong [odor] of an alcoholic beverage" when 
Sergeant Alexanderson approached Palmer. Additionally, Palmer 
had "an extremely difficult time" producing his driver's license, 
and "his speech was slurred" in a "thick tongue sort of" way. 
Sergeant Alexanderson, assisted by backup officers, suspected 
Palmer was intoxicated and administered three field sobriety 
tests; Palmer failed all three. Accordingly, Palmer was arrested 
for DUI. A subsequent breathalyzer test measured Palmer's blood 
alcohol concentration at .318, nearly four times the legal limit 
of .08, see id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (i), (iii). 
H4 Palmer was charged by information on January 4, 2005, with 
one count of DUI. Palmer pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial 
was scheduled for August 8, 2006. Despite receiving notice of 
the trial date, Palmer failed to appear and was convicted in 
absentia of DUI. By stipulation of the parties, the jury was 
excused, and the prosecution presented evidence of Palmer's prior 
convictions to the trial judge, resulting in an increase in 
Palmer's sentence. 
H5 At sentencing, Palmer argued his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial was violated when the trial judge, as opposed to the 
jury, considered the sentence enhancement based on Palmer's prior 
convictions.3 The trial court found Palmer's Sixth Amendment 
2. "'In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we 
resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict 
and the rulings of the trial court.1" State v. Yanez, 2002 UT 
App 50, H 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 
422, 422-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
3. Palmer's argument before the trial judge was that "his right 
to have the jury . . . consider the enhancement" was improperly 
(continued...) 
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rights were violated but denied Palmer's motion on the basis of 
harmless error The trial court sentenced Palmer to zero to five 
years m the Utah State Prison, and Palmer filed this appeal 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%6 Palmer presents one issue on appeal "Whether the trial 
court violated Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury 
consider his prior DUI convictions " "Constitutional 
issues are questions of law that we review for correctness " 
State v Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, H 7, 139 P 3d 1066 
ANALYSIS 
^7 The right to a jury trial m criminal proceedings is secured 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 4 See 
U S Const amend VI That amendment declares "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury "" Id 
3 ( continued) 
waived (Emphasis added ) Accordingly, the State suggests 
Palmer's argument on appeal- that subsection (6)(a) is an 
"element" and not merely an 'enhancement"--is unpreserved We 
disagree "The purpose of preserving the error is to assure that 
the trial court has had the claimed error brought to its 
attention m a timely fasnion, allowing the trial court the first 
opportunity to address and correct the problem " State v Beck, 
2007 UT 60, H 8, 165 P 3d 1225 In this case, the trial court 
addressed both enhancements and elements Indeed, the trial 
court cited to relevant authority and ultimately concluded that 
subsection (6)(a) is "not just a sentencing enhancement" but 
rather a new offense 
4 The right to a jury trial is also secured by Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution However, Palmer does not 
provide a separate analysis based on the Utah Constitution 
Indeed, Palmer's list of controlling statutes only contains the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "Therefore, 
we address only the federal provision " State v Jensen, 818 
P 2d 551, 552 n 2 (Utah 1991), see also State v Worwood, 2007 UT 
47, ^ 18, 164 P 3d 397 ("[Cjursory references to the state 
constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal 
constitutional claim are inadequate ") 
5 The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated 
(continued ) 
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H8 The Sixth Amendment's provisions have been interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court as providing a criminal defendant 
with "the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, if Palmer is correct that 
subsection 6(a) of Utah Code section 41-6-44 is intended as an 
element of the crime of DUI, we assume without deciding that 
Palmer had a constitutional right to have the jury determine 
whether or not the State proved that element. 
1|9 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled 
that the Sixth Amendment does not require prior convictions to be 
submitted to the jury when used merely as a sentence 
enhancement .c See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 
(2000) (" [A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases 
5 . ( . . .continued) 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and has been declared binding on 
the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) 
(" [W]e hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of 
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were they to be tried in 
a federal court--would come within the Sixth Amendment's 
guarantee."). 
6. This is an exception to the more general rule that sentence 
enhancements "must be . . . submitted to a jury, and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt" if they "increase [] the maximum 
penalty for a crime." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 
(2000) . Palmer suggests this exception stands on somewhat shaky 
footing. See id. at 489 (suggesting the prior conviction 
exception was incorrectly decided); Ranqel-Reyes v. United 
States, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 2874 (2006) (denying cert.) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) ("[I]t has long been clear that a majority of this 
Court now rejects that exception."). But see id. (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("While I continue to believe that Almendarez-Torres 
was wrongly decided, that is not a sufficient reason for 
revisiting the issue. . . . The doctrine of stare decisis 
provides sufficient basis for the denial of certiorari in these 
cases." (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998))). At this time, the exception still stands and has 
recently been reaffirmed. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. 
Ct. 856, 864, 869 (2007) ("Other than a prior conviction . . . 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be 
submitted to a jury . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (same). Unless 
and until Almendarez-Torres is actually reversed, it is 
controlling precedent on the scope of Palmer's Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
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the maximum penalty for a crime must be . . . submitted to a 
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)); 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998) 
(ruling recidivism was not an element of a particular offense 
and, therefore, need not be charged in an indictment or 
determined by a jury). Accordingly, if the State is correct that 
subsection 6(a) was intended as a sentence enhancement, relevant 
only after a DUI conviction had been secured, Palmer did not have 
a constitutional right to have the fact of his prior convictions 
decided by a jury. 
5] 10 Because Palmer's constitutional argument hinges on the 
classification of subsection 6(a) as either an element or a 
sentence enhancement, Palmer correctly recognizes that "[t]he 
real issue before this Court is whether Utah Code Annotated § 41-
6-44(6) (a) ([Supp. 2004]) provides separate elements . . . or 
whether this [sub]section is only an enhancement provision." 
" [T]he question of which factors are" elements and which factors 
are sentence enhancements "is normally a matter for [the 
legislative branch]." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228. 
We therefore look to the statute before us 
and ask what [the legislature] intended. Did 
it intend the . . . prior conviction[] to 
help define a separate crime? Or did it 
intend the presence of an earlier conviction 
as a sentencing factor, a factor that a 
sentencing court might use to increase 
punishment? In answering this question, we 
look to the statute's language, structure, 
subject matter, context, and history--factors 
that typically help courts determine a 
statute's objectives and thereby illuminate 
its text. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
1^11 Our review of Utah Code section 41-6-44 convinces us that 
the legislature did not intend subsection 6(a) to constitute a 
separate DUI offense but, rather, a sentence enhancement used to 
increase punishment for a recidivist. 
]^ 12 To begin with, subsection 6(a) 's subject matter is 
indicative of its design as a sentence enhancement. The Supreme 
Court interpreted a similar statutory provision in Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and emphasized that 
"the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism. That 
subject matter--prior commission of a . . . crime--is as typical 
a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Id. at 229-30. 
Likewise, the Court acknowledged that "the introduction of 
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evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant 
prejudice." Id. at 235. Accordingly, the Court assumed that 
"other things being equal, . . . Congress would [not] have wanted 
to create this kind of unfairness[--introduction of evidence of 
prior convictions during the guilt phase of the trial--]in 
respect to facts that are almost never contested." Id. For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court determined the statutory 
provision at issue in Almendare2-Torres was a sentence 
enhancement and not an element of the crime charged. See id. at 
234-35, 243-44 (" [T]o hold that the Constitution requires that 
recidivism be deemed an 'element' of petitioner's offense would 
mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of 
treating recidivism as going to the punishment only." (additional 
alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
|^13 Of course, the general indicators of legislative intent 
recognized by the Supreme Court must give way if evidence 
demonstrates that the Utah Legislature actually intended 
subsection (6)(a) to define a separate DUI crime. See id. at 
244. However, no such evidence exists. On the contrary, 
subsection (6)(a)' s plain language demonstrates it was not 
intended to define a separate crime but, rather, to operate as a 
sentence enhancement. See generally In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ^ 6 , 
165 P.3d 1206 ("The first step of statutory interpretation is to 
evaluate the best evidence of legislative intent: the plain 
language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory 
language we must assume the legislature used each term advisedly 
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
H14 Under subsection 6(a), " [a] conviction for a violation of 
Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is . . . a third or 
subsequent conviction . . . within ten years." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (6) (a) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Notably, 
subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit or declare any activity 
illegal. Compare id. § 41-6-44(2) ("A person may not . . . . 
(emphasis added)) , with id. § 41-6-44 (6) ("A conviction for a 
violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony . . . . 
(emphasis added)). Instead, subsection (6)(a) indicates that a 
defendant has been charged and convicted "for a violation of 
Subsection (2)." IcL_ § 41-6-44(6) (a) . 
1)15 In this case, subsection (2) made it illegal for Palmer to 
(1) operate a vehicle and (2) have a blood alcohol level above 
.08. See id. § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i), (iii). Those were the only 
elements necessary for Palmer's conviction.7 See State v. Perez-
Avila, 2006 UT App 71, H 11, 131 P.3d 864 ("[T]hat the State show 
7. Palmer concedes tha-t these elements were satisfied. 
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that a defendant operated a vehicle with a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 or greater . . . . [are] the only 
required showing[s] for DUI."). Subsection (6)(a) did not add to 
those two elements in any way, and, in fact, contained an express 
prerequisite before its provisions were applicable--" [a] 
conviction for a violation of Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44(6) (a) (emphasis added). Thus, Palmer's previous 
convictions were irrelevant to his guilt or innocence of the 
crime charged--DUI. See id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (i), (iii). 
Accordingly, we hold subsection 6(a) does not define a new crime 
but, rather, operates as a sentence enhancement after a 
conviction under subsection (2) has been obtained. See 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244 ("[R]ecidivism does not relate 
to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment 
only, and therefore . . . . [need not] be deemed an 'element' of 
petitioner's offense . . . ." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
[^16 Our ruling on this issue is further strengthened by the 
structure of the statute, which evidences the legislature's 
intent concerning when prior convictions should be considered 
elements necessary for the crime of DUI. Subsection (2) defines 
five different DUI offenses. For example, subsection (2)(a)(iii) 
makes it illegal to drive a vehicle with a blood alcohol level 
exceeding .08, regardless of whether the driver has prior DUI 
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iii); see also 
id. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i). However, subsection (2)(a)(v) imposes 
stricter limits for individuals with prior convictions. See id. 
§ 41-6-44(2)(a)(v). Subsection (2)(a)(v) makes it a crime to (1) 
be twenty-one years or older; (2) have a blood alcohol level of 
.05 or higher; (3) have a passenger under sixteen; and (4) have 
"committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction." 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iv) (creating 
similar restrictions). Thus, under subsection (2)(a)(v), a prior 
conviction is contained in the provision that defines the crime 
charged. We are obligated to assume that the legislature's 
decision to include prior convictions within subsection (2)(a)(v) 
but not within subsection (2) (a) (iii) was deliberate. See Davis 
County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, \\ 10-
11, 52 P.3d 1174 (relying on a statute's structure when 
interpreting its meaning). 
\\1 Our ruling on this issue necessarily rejects Palmer's 
argument that State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 
(1953), compels a different result. In Harris, a defendant's 
prior DUI convictions were submitted to the jury and the trial 
judge improperly commented on the evidence. See id. at 285-86. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, 
ruling: "[T]he right of an accused to trial by jury, assured by 
the provisions of our State Constitution, means that all issues 
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of fact shall be submitted to them and that the Court should 
neither expressly nor by implication indicate his opinion upon 
the facts or as to the weight of the evidence." Id. (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). The court then noted that n[t]he 
prior conviction was a material element of the" misdemeanor DUI 
charge and remanded for a new trial without the judge's 
impermissible comments. Id. at 286. 
1^18 Harris is distinguishable from this case for several 
reasons. First, Harris was decided under the Utah Constitution 
and not under the United States Constitution. See generally Wood 
v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ^ 29, 67 P.3d 436 
("We note that our state constitution may, under some 
circumstances, provide greater protections for our citizens than 
are required under the federal constitution.").8 Second, Harris 
was a correct statement of the law as it existed at that time. 
The Utah Supreme Court decided Harris forty-five years before the 
United States Supreme Court articulated the difference between 
elements and enhancements, carving out an exception to the Sixth 
Amendment for recidivism enhancements. See Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998) (ruling prior 
convictions need not be submitted to jury when used as sentence 
enhancements).9 Third, the statute considered in Harris has been 
amended more than forty times between 1953 and 2004. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 History notes. Those amendments include the 
key language at issue in this case. See Amendments to Operating 
Under the Influence, ch. 205, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (iv) - (v) , 
2004 Utah Laws 785, 786 (imposing additional limits on 
individuals with prior convictions); Driving Under the Influence 
Penalty Amendments, ch. 64, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (6) (a) , 2001 Utah 
Laws 246, 247 (amending subsection (6)(a) to read: "A conviction 
for a violation of subsection (2) is a third degree felony if 
. . . . " ) ; Revisions to Driving Under the Influence, ch. 289, 
sec. 1, § 41-6-44(6)(a), 2001 Utah Laws 1349, 1350 (same, but 
8. Palmer has neither cited the Utah Constitution nor argued a 
broader protection here. 
9. The Supreme Court not only carved out the exception for 
recidivism, but also suggested that recidivism will generally be 
treated as a sentence enhancement. See Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 234-35, 243-44 (1998) (" [T]o 
hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an 
element of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt departure 
from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as going to 
the punishment only." (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496 (2000) 
("[R]ecidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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extending the relevant time period). Further, these amendments 
came after the United States Supreme Court opinions 
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, see, e.g., 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35, and presumably were made 
with knowledge of that authority, see Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 
U.S. 511, 516 (1993) (assuming Congress was familiar with prior 
judicial opinions); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991) 
("We certainly presume that . . . when Congress selected this 
language, our elected representatives were familiar with our 
recently announced opinions . . . . " ) ; Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 
29, 1^ 39, 158 P.3d 532 ("We presume the Legislature is aware of 
our case law . . , . " ) . If the Utah Legislature intended to 
preserve a right to jury trial for recidivism enhancements under 
subsections (2)(a)(i) to (iii), it need only to have moved that 
subject into the definition of the crime itself, as it did for 
subsections (2)(a)(iv) and (v). 
i]l9 Moreover, recent decisions from our appellate courts have 
routinely referred to subsection 6(a) as an "enhancement 
provision."10 See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 696 P.2d 1209, 1209 
(Utah 1985) (mem.) (per curiam) ("Defendant was convicted . . . 
of [DUI]. She was sentenced . . . under the enhancement 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44(d)." (emphasis added)); 
State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, U 23, 143 P.3d 302 (" [W] e 
reverse only the enhancement of [the defendant's] DUI offense, 
and not the underlying DUI conviction itself . . . ." (emphasis 
added)), cert, dismissed, No. 20060817, 2007 Utah Lexis 234 (July 
25, 2007); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775 
(repeatedly referring to defendant's felony DUI conviction as an 
enhancement or enhanced penalty obtained under the "enhancement 
provision"); State v. Soto, 2006 UT App 122U, para. 4 (mem.) (per 
curiam) ("[S]ection 41-6-44(6)(a), by its clear terms, permits 
enhancement based on a [prior] DUI . . . ." (emphasis added)); 
State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 431U, para. 4 (mem.) (per curiam) 
(" [T]he DUI statute unambiguously enhances a third conviction to 
a third degree felony . . . ." (emphasis added)); State v. 
Hawley, 2001 UT App 284U, para. 5 (mem.) ("[T]he DUI conviction 
was properly enhanced to a third degree felony." (emphasis 
10. Palmer's own arguments appear to recognize subsection 6(a)'s 
role as an enhancement provision. Palmer's argument to the trial 
court was that "his right to have the jury . . . consider the 
enhancement" was improperly waived. Likewise, Palmer identified 
the issue on appeal as, "Whether the trial court violated 
Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury consider his prior 
DUI convictions for enhancement purposes . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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added)) .1X Unlike other enhancement factors, see, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A) - (C) (Supp. 2004) , there is no 
federal constitutional right to a jury trial for "recidivist 
enhancements . "12 
]^20 Finally, we reject the dissent's argument that subsection 
6(a) should not be read as a sentence enhancement because the 
increase from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony is 
dramatic and subjects the defendant to "serious collateral 
effects." See infra J^ 31. While we agree that there are 
significant collateral consequences to the elevation of a charge 
from misdemeanor to felony, we do not agree that these 
consequences invalidate the holdings of Apprendi and Almendarez-
Torres. Indeed, virtually all of the other jurisdictions that 
have addressed this issue have rejected that proposition. See, 
e.g., Talley v. State, No. 172, 2003 Del. Lexis 643, at *5 (Dec. 
29, 2003) (rejecting argument that prior DUI convictions were 
elements because they increased sentence from a misdemeanor to a 
felony); People v. Braman, 765 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (111. App. Ct. 
2002) (affirming trial court's enhancement of DUI conviction from 
11. The dissent argues Harris "has not been altered, 
distinguished, or reversed," see infra <] 28, and that "no other 
case has contradicted" its holding that "prior convictions are to 
be treated as an element," see infra |^ 30. However, these cases 
state that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement provision. The 
explicit language of these rulings, in light of the post-Harris 
precedent of the United States Supreme Court clearly 
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, convinces us 
that Harris has at least been put into question. See, e.g. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000); Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998). Moreover, 
in the more than fifty years since Harris was decided, neither 
Utah appellate court has relied on Harris for the proposition the 
dissent suggests. 
12. Regardless of whether the factors contained in section 41-6-
44(3)(a)(ii)(A)-(C) are deemed elements, as argued by the 
dissent, or enhancements that increase the maximum penalty, as we 
hold, these factors must be submitted to the jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. In 
contrast, recidivist enhancements stand on a unique legal footing 
that allows the trial judge to determine if the defendant is a 
repeat offender. Consequently, the designation of a factor as an 
enhancement or an element will determine whether that fact must 
be proved to obtain a conviction, or merely to enhance the 
punishment after conviction. Designation as an enhancement will 
not, however, definitively answer the question of whether the 
jury must decide whether that fact has been proved. 
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misdemeanor to felony even though defendant's prior convictions 
were not submitted to the jury), State v Kendall, 58 P 3d 660, 
667-68 (Kan 2002) (rejecting argument that defendant's "two 
prior DUI convictions must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt before that fact can be used to change the 
classification of [the defendant's] crime from a misdemeanor to a 
felony"), State v Pike, 162 S W 3d 464, 470 (Mo 2005) (holding 
DUI enhancement from a misdemeanor to a felony based on a prior 
conviction did not constitute a new offense) State v hebaron, 
808 A 2d 541, 543-45 (N H 2002) (holding prior convictions "need 
not have been proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt" 
even though they increased defendant's sentence from a 
misdemeanor to a felony) But see United States v Rodnguez-
Gonzales, 358 F 3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir 2004) ("The existence of 
a prior conviction substantively transforms a second 
conviction under the statute from a misdemeanor to a felony A 
prior conviction is therefore more than a sentencing factor 
ii ) 1 3 
J^21 In addition, the dissent's argument ignores the "serious 
collateral effects" of confinement m prison In Almendarez 
Torres v United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a sentence 
enhancement which increased a defendant's potential term of 
confinement m prison from two years to twenty years based solely 
upon the defendant's prior convictions need not be submitted to 
the jury See 523 U S at 226-27 Almendarez-Torres was 
reaffirmed m Apprendi and other courts have applied these cases 
13 The validity of Rodriguez-Gonzales is m question The 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered and rejected a similar 
argument m 2002 See United States v Corona-Sanchez, 291 F 3d 
1201, 1208-11 (9th Cir 2002) (en banc), overruled m part by 
United States v Rodriguez, 76 U S L W 4302 (2008) (holding that 
"maximum penalty prescribed by law" as used m federal Armed 
Career Criminal Act includes any time added under recidivist 
enhancements) Notably, the en banc majority did so over the 
dissent's objection that " [r] aismg the level of crime from a 
misdemeanor to a felony adds such grave consequences for the 
individual charged with a crime that it seems wholly 
inconceivable that the element which causes this escalation can 
be deemed merely a sentencing factor " Id at 1218-19 (Kozmski, 
J , dissenting) Moreover, since the decision m Rodriguez -
Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit has held that the increase of a 
defendant's sentence from twenty years m prison to "a mandatory 
minimum sentence of life imprisonment based on [the trial 
court's] finding that [defendant] had two prior" convictions was 
a sentencing factor which did not need to be submitted to the 
jury United States v. McCanev, 177 F App'x 704, 709-10 (9th 
Cir.), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 831 (2006) 
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to instances where a defendant's term of confinement was enhanced 
to a sentence of life in prison. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 696 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 186 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Phipps, 259 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2001). See generally 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35 (holding the "magnitude of 
the increase in the maximum authorized sentence" "prove [d] 
little" (emphasis omitted)). Thus, while the dissent correctly 
notes that enhancing a defendant's sentence to a felony means the 
defendant may "incur serious collateral effects such as 
employment and deportation . . . as well as loss of voting and 
gun possession privileges," see infra ^ 31, we find these 
"serious collateral effects" pale in comparison to the complete 
loss of freedom--sometimes for life--approved by the Supreme 
Court and applied by other jurisdictions. For example, in 
addition to his confinement for twenty rather than two years, the 
defendant in Almendarez-Torres could not vote, possess a gun, or 
obtain gainful employment during the eighteen extra years he was 
incarcerated. Accordingly, although we acknowledge the very real 
consequences of elevating a charge from a misdemeanor to a 
felony, we are unpersuaded that the consequences are greater than 
those present in Almendarez-Torres.14 
1]22 Because subsection (6) (a) is a sentence enhancement based on 
recidivism and not an element of the crime charged, Palmer did 
not have a constitutional right to have his prior convictions 
decided by a jury.15 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
476 (2000); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35; Jones v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999). Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's ruling on these grounds. See State v. Tueller, 
2001 UT App 317, *{ 23, 37 P.3d 1180 ("It is a well-established 
rule that we may affirm a judgment of the trial court on grounds 
other than those used as the basis for its decision.").16 
14. Under the dissent's argument, the State would be incapable of 
"enhancing" numerous crimes, as opposed to charging them as new 
crimes with separate "elements," regardless of the number of 
defendant's prior convictions. Under Utah law, even the most 
severe misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment "for a term not 
exceeding one year." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (2003). Thus, 
anytime the legislature determines the punishment for a repeat 
offender should extend incarceration beyond one year, it must do 
so by changing the level of the offense to a felony. 
15. Proof of Palmer's previous convictions was submitted by 
exhibit to the trial court and included in the record on appeal. 
16. Even if we agreed with the dissent that Palmer has a 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
U23 We conclude that subsection (6) (a) is a penalty provision 
that simply increases the sentence for a recidivist. Because the 
Sixth Amendment does not require recidivism to be submitted to 
the jury when used merely as a sentence enhancement, we affirm 
Palmer's felony sentence for driving under the influence. 
1]24 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
<I2 5 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
1|26 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this 
case, which concludes that the legislature intended Utah Code 
section 41-6-44(6) (a) to constitute a sentence enhancement used 
to increase punishment for a recidivist rather than a separate 
DUI offense element. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) (Supp. 
2004). In particular, I disagree with the majority's treatment 
of State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), and with 
the majority's statutory interpretation of section 41-6-44. 
16 . ( . . .continued) 
constitutional right to have his prior convictions submitted to 
the jury, any violation of that right may very well be subject to 
harmless-error analysis--an issue we need not address today. See 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1999) (applying 
harmless error analysis, rather than structural error, where jury 
was not instructed on one element of the offense); Washington v. 
Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551-53 (2006) ("Failure to submit a 
sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element 
to the jury, is not structural error."). 
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^27 Both the pertinent case law ruling in Harris that a prior 
conviction is a material element for which the jury must 
determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the text of the 
statute--which does not unambiguously provide that prior 
convictions are to be used merely as a sentencing enhancement, 
support the conclusion that subsection (6)(a)--is a separate 
offense that includes the violation described in subsection 
(2) (a) and adds the additional element of "a third or subsequent 
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more 
prior convictions." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) . 
1^28 To begin, I disagree with the majority's disregard of 
Harris. The majority attempts to distinguish Harris from this 
case by stating first that it is not applicable because it was 
decided under Utah's Constitution, which Palmer has not cited. 
Nonetheless, Harris is binding law that is directly on point. In 
Harris, the supreme court interpreted and applied a similar 
version of the relevant statute. The majority fails to 
acknowledge that although Harris was decided forty-five years 
ago, it has not been altered, distinguished, or reversed since 
the Utah Supreme Court decided it. 
|^29 Second, the majority dismisses Harris because the case was 
decided before the United States Supreme Court decided 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and 
because section 41-6-44 has been amended more than forty times 
since Harris was decided. However, Almendarez-Torres provides 
little guidance as to whether the Utah State Legislature intended 
subsection 41-6-44(6) (a) to be a separate element of the offense 
or just a penalty enhancement. In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme 
Court merely held that Congress intended to set forth a 
sentencing factor in United States Code subsection 1326(b)(2). 
See 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) (1988). Thus, it makes no difference 
that Harris was decided prior to Almendarez-Torres. 
1)30 Although the majority is correct in pointing out that Utah 
Code section 41-6-44 has been amended over forty times since 
Harris, the language and structure of the code is substantially 
the same. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953); see id. § 41-6-44 
(Supp. 2004) . Both versions of the statute set forth the initial 
elements of a DUI crime and then provide additional elements in 
later subsections. See id. § 41-6-44(d) (1953) ("Every person 
who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished 
upon a first conviction by . . . , a second or subsequent 
conviction, . . . shall be punished by . . . ." (emphasis 
added)); id^ § 41-6-44 (6) (a) (2004) ("A conviction for a 
violation of [sjubsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within 
ten years . . . . * » (emphasis added) ) . Additionally, it is of no 
real consequence that the majority suggests that recent decisions 
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have referred to subsection (6)(a) as an enhancement provision. 
Instead, it is key that Harris provides that prior convictions 
are to be treated as an element and no othpr case has 
contradicted that holding. 
1131 Moreover, the plain language and structure of the statute 
supports the Harris ruling that a prior conviction is a material 
element for which the jury must determine proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. First, I disagree with the majority's focus on 
the fact that recidivism is the relevant subject matter of the 
statute, which the majority considers to be merely a typical 
factor to be considered at sentencing. See supra <] 12; see also 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230. Although recidivism may be 
used as a sentencing factor, this categorization alone does not 
make clear the meaning of the statute. Rather, the issue before 
us is whether the legislature intended prior convictions under 
subsection (6)(b), that not only increases punishment but alters 
the degree of the charge, to be treated as a sentence enhancement 
or an element of the offense. A statute that allows a defendant 
to be charged and convicted without a jury trial on elements 
which change the charge from a class B misdemeanor to a third 
degree felony is disconcerting and reaches beycnd mere punishment 
enhancement to subject a defendant convicted of such a felony to 
potentially incur serious collateral effects such as employment 
and deportation issues as well as loss of voting and gun 
possession privileges.1 
1|32 I am not persuaded by the majority's reading of the plain 
language. The majority considers the plain language of 
subsections (6)(a) and (2) in conjunction with one another and 
determines that because subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit any 
particular activity or provide additional elements to those 
already articulated in subsection (2), that the language in 
subsection (6) (a) , " [a] conviction for a violation of 
[sjubsection (2)," is an express prerequisite to application of 
subsection (6)(a), making subsection (6)(a) a sentencing 
enhancement only. 
1|J3 Rather, I read subsection (6) (a) as providing an additional 
element to those contained in subsection (2). Subsection (6)(a) 
makes it clear that before a defendant may be charged and 
convicted of a third degree felony DUI an additional element must 
be established, i.e., "a third or subsequent conviction 
. . . within ten years of two or more prior convictions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (6) (a) (2004). As such, Palmer should not be 
convicted of third degree DUI without proof beyond a reasonable 
1. Under federal law, a c^nvi^ted felon may not possess a gun. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) . 
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doubt that he had a third DUI conviction within ten years. 
Moreover, a prior conviction ought to be considered as an element 
because it is the only difference between a class B misdemeanor 
and third degree felony DUI. Without such a reading, the two 
charges would merge and a defendant who met all of the elements 
for a class B misdemeanor could be charged and convicted for a 
third degree felony with the presence or absence of a prior 
conviction considered only at sentencing. 
1134 Finally, the structure of the statute supports the Harris 
ruling and the plain language reading of the statute articulated 
above. The majority also considers the structure of the statute 
and notes that several DUI crimes described in subsection 
(2) include within that section the element of prior convictions. 
While the majority would conclude that because we assume that the 
legislature's decision to include prior convictions within 
subsection (2)(a)(iv) and (v), and not within subsection 
(2)(a)(iii)--the section Palmer is being charged with--the 
difference was deliberate, and the prior conviction articulated 
in subsection (6)(a) is merely a sentencing enhancement. The 
majority concludes that had the legislature wanted to include 
prior conviction as an element to the violation articulated in 
(2) (a) (iii) it would have done so within that subsection and not 
in a later subsection. However, a closer look at the structure 
of the statute reveals evidence that the legislature intended 
prior convictions under subsection (6)(a) to be treated as an 
element of the crime of third degree felony DUI. 
1)35 The statute contains several sections which provide 
additional elements in a structure similar to subsection (6)(a). 
See id. §§ 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A) -(C) , (3) (b) . For instance, 
subsection (3) (a) (ii) (B) incorporates the additional element of 
"ha[ving] a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense" into the violation articulated in subsection 
(2) . Id_^  § 41-6-44(3) (a) (ii)(B). Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B), 
which requires proof of "a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense" has been treated as an 
element regardless of its appearance in a subsection other than 
(2). Id. This court held that 
fbj ased upon the plain language of [section 
41-6-44,] . . . . [t]o convict a defendant of 
violating the part of the section 41-6-44 
under which [the defendant] was charged, the 
[s]tate is required to prove that the 
defendant had a "blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control" 
of the vehicle and that the defendant "had a 
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passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense." 
State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, <[ 12, 76 P.3d 198 (citation 
omitted). Thus, by holding that prior convictions under 
subsection (6) (a) are not considered additional elements because 
they do not appear in subsection (2), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-
41-6-44(2)(a)(iv)-(v), contradicts case law. Moreover, the 
application of said reasoning would effectively make the 
additional elements listed throughout the statute sentencing 
factors. See id, § 41-6-44(3)(a)(iii)(A)-(C). The discord 
between the statute's construction incorporating prior 
convictions under subsection (2) for some DUI charges and 
providing additional elements elsewhere in the statute for other 
DUI charges may be due to the fact that subsections (2)(a)(iv) 
and (v) were not original to the statute and were added in 2004. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004) (amendment notes). 
Based on the structure of the code as analyzed above it is my 
belief that the legislature intended subsection (6) (a)'s prior 
conviction language to be treated as an additional element and 
not a sentencing enhancement." 
%36 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
2. The majority asserts that this reading of the statute would 
make the State "incapable of 'enhancing' numerous crimes 
regardless of the number of defendant's prior convictions" and 
would require the legislature to change the level of offense to a 
felony anytime it determines the punishment for a repeat offender 
should extend incarceration beyond one year. Supra |^ 21 n.14. 
This is not my position, nor would it be the result of treating 
prior convictions as an element of a DUI offense. Instead, the 
result of treating prior convictions as an element would be to 
avoid perfunctorily enhancing numerous crimes which may have 
serious collateral effects and to ensure that any such 
enhancements would be done thoughtfully and with due process. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Westlaw, 
UT ST §41-6-44 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41 6-44 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
-+ § 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration--Measurement of blood 
or breath alcohol--Criminal punishment--Arrest without warrant--
Penal ties--Suspension or revocation of License. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed mental health 
therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of: 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (1)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance 
with Section 62A-15-105. 
(b)(i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is 
taken illegally in the body; 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination 
of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(F) Subsection 58-37-8 (2) (g) ; 
(G) a violation described in Subsections (1) (b) (i) (A) through (F) , which judgment 
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of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any 
district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a 
violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments administered 
under 1_0_U_:_S - C . Sec. 815 ; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections 
(1) (b) (i) (A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, 
Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been 
subsequently reduced or dismissed, in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement, 
for purposes of: 
(A) enhancement of penalties under: 
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving; 
and 
(II) automobile homicide under _Section 76-_5-J207; and 
(B) expungement under Sect ion 7 7-18-12. 
(c) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance 
with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a person: 
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of: 
(A) an assessment; or 
(B) an educational series; and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance 
with Section 62A-15-105; 
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with 
Section 62A-15-105; 
(g) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse program; 
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar 
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to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehi.cle within 
this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of operation or actual physical control; 
(iv)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of . 05 grams or greater 
at the time of the test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of operation 
o r a c tua 1 phys .1 ca 1 contro 1; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or 
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time 
of operation or actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of operation 
or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams 
of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
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(3 ) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsections (2 ) (a) (i) 
through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; 
or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a. violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree 
felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury upon another 
as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the 
person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 4 8 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found appropriate 
by a screening under Subsection (4)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not 
order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and 
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(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4) (e) (ii) , the court may order probation for 
the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of 
.16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14) . 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the 
person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found appropriate 
by a screening under Subsection (5)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not 
order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14) . 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it 
is : 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or 
more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
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(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2 001; 
or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is 
reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3) (b) or (6) (a) , if the court suspends the execution of a prison 
sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6) (a) or (c) , the court shall impose an order requiring the person 
to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse 
treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow-through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6) (c) , if the court orders 
probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the 
person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be suspended 
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence 
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a 
conviction for a violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4) , (5) , and (6) that require a sentencing court 
to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an assessment, if appropriate; 
and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion of the court, substance abuse 
treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance eibuse treatment; or do a combination of those 
things, apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assessment, an 
educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second, 
or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), 
as the court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, 
or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b)(i) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(A) complete all court ordered: 
(I) screening; 
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(II) assessment; 
(III) educational series; 
(IV) substance abuse treatment; and 
(V) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(B) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs. 
(ii) Upon receiving the notification described in Subsection (8) (b) (i) , the division 
shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 
53-3-221 (2) and (3) . 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41 -6-43, or of 
Sect i on 41-6-44 . 6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a 
violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record, a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, 
or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in 
connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this 
Subsection (9) (b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of _Sectiqn 
4lyjo
 z 4 5 . 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this 
section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in the peace officer's presence, and if the peace officer has probable cause 
to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 9 0 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first 
time under Subsection (2) ,-
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense 
under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined under 
Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of ten years from the 
date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection 
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(12) . 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period 
the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 
o r
 5 3-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which 
the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) (i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order 
the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) 
to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 9 0 days, 180 days, one year, or 
two years to remove from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided in this Subsection (12) 
shall begin the date on which the individual would be eligible to reinstate the 
individual's driving privilege for a violation of Subsection (2). 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12) (b) , 
the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend 
or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use 
of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate 
corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider 
of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, 
so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (13) (e) to 
place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring 
equipment in the residence of the person or other specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance 
abu s e t e s t ing i n s t rumen t; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol, the person may consume during the time the person 
is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school 
educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities 
and the person's home; and 
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(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person 
is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered 
directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by 
contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court 
under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4) (e) 
or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract with 
a probation monitoring agency or a private probe* t ion provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's 
compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and. 
court orders received under this article and shall notify the court of any failure to 
comply with or complete that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the 
person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14) (b) shall cover the costs 
of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is admissible 
evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall. 
order the following, or describe on record why the order or orders are not appropriate: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d); and 
(b) one or both of the following: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for 
the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
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41-6-43 MOTOR VEHICLES 
in an accident shall also file with the designated city department a report 
of such accident or a copy of any report herein required to be filed with 
the department. All such reports shall be for the confidential use of the 
city department and subject to the provisions of section 41-6-40. 
History: L. 19<llf ch. 52, § 32; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-109. Autornobiles<§^10. 
„ . , . „ „ 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §43. 
Compiler's Note. ^ 
The reference in this section to "section 
41-6-40" appeared in the act as "section 
30." 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Section 41-6-43. Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-44. Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drug—Habit-
ual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content 
in blood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license. 
41-6-45. Reckless driving—Penalty. 
41-6-43. Powers of local authorities.— (a) Local authorities may by 
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is an 
habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive or be in actual physical 
control of any vehicle, and provide penalties therefor as a first offense 
consistent with section 41-6-44. 
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person 
who drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving, and provide penalties 
therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-45. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 33; C. 1943, Cross-Eeference. 
57-7-110. Powers and duties of cities and towns 
r, .-, , -vr . generally, 10-8-1 et seq. 
Compiler's Note. b Ji i 
The references in this section to "section 1. Powers of cities. 
41-6-44" and "section 41-6-45" appeared c i ty held to have power to pass or-
in the act as "section 34 of this act" and dinance prohibiting driving while intoxi-
"section 35 of this act" respectively. cated, notwithstanding statute on the sub-
Comparable Provision. \*f J f }fk* C i t ^ / ' T f u ^ T 9 7 U ' 
^ 113, 93 P. 2d 671. (Moffat, C. J., and 
Uniform Act, § IS (unlawful for habit- Larson, J. ; dissenting.) 
ual user of narcotic drugs or one under 
influence of intoxicating liquor or narco- Collateral References, 
tic drugs to drive vehicle on h ighway) ; AutomobUes<^332. 
§ 19 (unlawful to drive vehicle carelessly
 6 1 a J > s > M o t o r Vehicles 8 62S. 
and heedlessly in wilful or wanton dis- Driving while intoxicated, 5 Am. Jur. 
regard of rights or safety of others, or
 9 1 6 ; Automobiles 8 766 et seq. 
without due caution and at speed or in '_. 
manner so as to endanger any person or Constitutionality of legislative delega-
property; constitutes reckless driving).
 t i o n o f p o w e r s t o p r e 3 C r i g e o r Vilry r e | u . 
lations concerning motor vehicles used on 
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546. 
41-6-44. Driving- while under influence of intoxicating- liquor or d r u g -
Habitual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content in 
blood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license.—(a) It is unlawful 
178 
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and punishable as provided in subdivision (d) of this section for any 
person who is an habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive 
or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this state. 
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subdivision (a) of 
this section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood at 
the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, 
urine, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following* 
presumptions. 
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol 
in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was 
not under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 
0.15 per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact 
shall not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was 
not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be con-
sidered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant; 
3. If there was at that time 0.15 per cent or more by weight of alcohol 
in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
4. The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed 
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing 
upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. 
(e) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subdivision (d) of 
this subsection for any person who is an habitual user of or under the 
influence of any narcotic drug or who is under the influence of any 
other drug to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle to drive a vehicle within this state. The fact that any person 
charged with a violation of this subsection is or has been entitled to use 
such drug under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense 
against any charge of violating this subsection. 
(d) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall 
be punished upon a first conviction by imprisonment for not less than 
,\() rla-rro >->A>- -m/^-Mo + h a-n ft m n n f h Q r\r* h^r « f i n o f . v f l -n r\+ I noo f l- .ro-. cM f i n - ^ ^ ~ 
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raore than $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and on a second 
o r
 subsequent conviction, or on a conviction under this section subse-
quent to a conviction under an ordinance in section 41-6-43 (a), shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not less than 90 days nor more than one 
year and, in the discretion of the court, a fine of not more than $1,000. 
™°r the purpose of this section such second violation shall have occurred 
within three years of the preceding violation. 
The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of 
auy person convicted under this section or under an ordinance as pro-
dded by section 41-6-43 (a). 
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